We investigate the bene ts of using a synchronous data-ow language for programming critical real-time systems. These bene ts concern ergonomy | since the data ow approach meets traditional description tools used in this domain |, and ability to support formal design and veri cation methods. We show, on a simple example, how the language Lustre and its associated veri cation tool Lesar, can be used to design a program, to specify its critical properties, and to verify these properties. As the language Lustre and its use have been already published in several papers (e.g., 11, 18]), we put particular emphasis on program veri cation. A preliminary version of this paper has been published in 28].
Introduction
It is useless to repeat why real-time programs are among those in which errors can have the most dramatic consequences. Thus, these programs constitute a domain where there is a special need of rigorous design methods. We advocate a \language approach" to this problem, arguing that the programming language used has a direct in uence in the quality of the software, from several points of view:
(i) The language should allow a natural description of the problem to be solved. In particular, it should be close to the traditional tools used in its application eld.
(ii) The language should be formally sound, in order to support formal veri cation methods.
(iii) The language should be simple enough to minimize the risk of misunderstanding about program meanings.
These were our main goals in designing the language Lustre 11, 18] . To meet the criterion (i),
we started from the traditional description tools used in the design of process control systems: At a higher level, these tools consist of mathematical formalisms (di erential equations, boolean equations, : : :) while at a lower level, people often use data-ow nets (block-diagrams, analog schemas, switch or gate networks, : : :). These two classes of tools are closely related: For instance,
This work was partially supported by ESPRIT Basic Research Action \SPEC" and by a contract from Merlin Gerin di erential equations, nite di erence equations, boolean equations can be straightforwardly translated, respectively, into analog schemas, block-diagrams and gate networks. At least the class of high level tools also meets our criterion (ii), since they are derived from the mathematical language. Other authors (e.g., 23, 2] ) claimed that such declarative formalisms are simpler and cleaner than usual imperative languages, where assignments, side-e ects, aliasing, parameter passing mechanisms, are unnatural phenomena which are di cult to understand and manage. We agree with this claim, and therefore consider that these declarative formalisms constitute a good basis for designing a programming language meeting the criterion (iii).
Lustre is a synchronous data-ow language, initially inspired from Lucid. As in Lucid, any Lustre variable or expression is considered to represent the sequence of values it takes during the whole execution of the program, and Lustre operators are considered to operate globally over these sequences. The synchronous nature of the language consists in assuming that all the variables and expressions in a program take the n-th value of their respective sequences at the same time. More concretely, a program is intended to have a cyclic behavior, an execution cycle consisting in computing the n-th value of each variable or expression. Basically, a program is a set of equations. When we write an equation \X=E", where X is a variable and E is an expression, we mean that the sequences of values associated with X and E are identical (it is an actual equation, in the mathematical sense), or equivalently, that at any cycle of the program, X and E take the same value.
Time and synchrony
The \real time" capabilities of the language are derived from this synchronous interpretation, like in other synchronous languages 6, 8, 13, 21, 24] : We consider the following logical notion of time: As soon as we can specify the order or simultaneity relations between events occurring both inside and outside the program, we can express time constraints about the behavior of the program. For instance, a constraint like \any occurrence of a dangerous situation must be followed by the emission of an alarm within a delay of 2 seconds" will be expressed as \after any occurrence of the event dangerous situation there must be an occurrence of the event alarm before the 2nd next occurrence of the event second" This example shows that, in synchronous programming, the \real", physical time is considered as an external event (here second), which has no privileged nature. This is the multiform time point of view: Time may be counted in \seconds" as well as in \meters", since there is no conceptual di erence between the two following requirements: the train must stop within 10 seconds and the train must stop within 100 meters In a synchronous language, these constraints are expressed in similar ways, in contrast with languages like ADA, where \real" time is handled by special statements.
In Lustre, an event will be modeled by a boolean variable, whose value is true whenever the event occurs.
The synchronous interpretation is an abstract point of view which consider the program reaction time to be negligible with respect to the reaction time of its environment. The advantages of this abstraction have been pointed out 5, 4, 3] concerning the semantics cleanness and the fact that it reconciles concurrency and determinism. In particular 4] argues that synchronous languages are particularly well-suited for programming reactive kernels of real-time systems, while complex systems generally require the combination of asynchronous and synchronous modules. We do not claim, therefore, that synchronous languages are general purpose languages, but rather specialized tools to design such kernels.
One may wonder about the realism of the synchronous hypothesis, since it assumes that the machine instantly reacts to input events. In fact, it only assumes that the reaction time is short enough to accurately distinguish and order the incoming events. In practice, it can be checked by measuring the maximum reaction time of the program. Synchronous languages can be implemented in a particularly e cient and measurable way, following a technique developed for Esterel 6] . Two versions of Lustre compilers have been written 11, 20] , which use this technique. The object code is structured as a nite automaton, a transition of which corresponds to a reaction of the program 1 . The code corresponding to such a transition is linear (loop-free), and its maximal execution time can be accurately bounded, on a given machine. Therefore, the validity of the synchrony hypothesis can be checked, and it is the only \real-time" issue in the synchronous approach. All the design and veri cation we will perform rely on that checking.
In Section 2, we brie y present the language, whose use is illustrated in Section 3 on a small example adapted from an actual subway device.
Speci cation and veri cation
The remainder of the paper is devoted to program veri cation. As said before, the synchronous approach limits the \timing" veri cation to checking the validity of the synchrony hypothesis. So, the kind of veri cation we have in mind is similar to standard veri cation on transition systems. It has nothing to do with methods and models (like, e.g., 16, 26] ) taking into account the program execution time | which is always assumed to be zero in the synchronous model. Moreover, our goal is not to prove the correctness of a program with respect to some complete speci cations, but rather to express and verify some critical properties. For instance, in an aircraft ight control system, an error in the speed computation can have only slight consequences, whereas it is critical that the undercarriage be locked when landing. Our claim is that these critical properties are usually simple, and can be veri ed by means of available automatic techniques. The main reason for this claim is that experience shows that most of these properties are \safety" properties which state that a given situation should never occur, or that a given statement should always hold, in contrast with \liveness" properties which state that a given situation should eventually occur in the future 2 . For instance, a relevant question is not that a train will eventually stop, but that it never crosses a red light. This is an important remark as proof techniques for safety properties are known to be much simpler than for liveness properties:
Safety properties can be checked on program abstractions: Intuitively, one can simplify a given program P into an abstract program P 0 , having \more behaviors" than P. If P 0 satis es a safety property, so does P. This abstraction technique is valuable all the more as experience shows that the considered critical properties seldom depend on numerical 1 This compiling technique is speci c to synchronous languages, since, in an asynchronous language, the non deterministic interleaving of asynchronous actions would involve immediately a combinatorial explosion of the automaton size. 2 As a matter of fact, liveness properties are often introduced to \abstract" response time constraints, which must be taken fully into account in a real-time system. relations and computations, but more often on logical dependencies over events. So their proof can often be handled on nite state abstractions of programs. Safety properties can be checked on program states, rather than on execution paths. In the approach we will propose, any veri cation problem amounts at proving that some program never outputs the value false. In the nite state case, such a veri cation can be done by a simple traversal of the state graph, without keeping track of any path in that graph. Very e cient methods 22] have been proposed for such a traversal.
Safety properties can be modularly veri ed: With any process composition operator ?, one can easily associate an operator ? such that, for any two processes P 1 and P 2 , respectively satisfying safety properties 1 and 2 , their composition P 1 ? P 2 satis es 1 ? 2 . So, a veri cation problem can be decomposed into simpler ones. So, our ambition is rather modest | since we restrict ourselves to checking safety properties on nite state (abstractions of) programs | with the hope of getting e cient tools tackling many real-life cases.
In view of this discussion, we propose a method for specifying and checking simple safety properties about Lustre programs. In Section 4, we show that we can take advantage of the declarative nature of Lustre, to express the properties in the same language: It has been
shown 7] that any safety property about a program can be expressed by the invariance of some boolean Lustre expression. This is due to the fact that Lustre can be viewed as an executable temporal logic. Concerning ergonomics, there is an obvious advantage of using a full programming language instead of a temporal logic. In particular, the user can de ne its own temporal operators 3 , thus reducing the complexity of property expression.
Moreover, Lustre provides a means of expressing assumptions about the program environment. This is an essential feature, since the interaction of a real-time program with its environment is particularly important. In general, the properties of a real-time program are intended to hold only under some assumptions about the behavior of its environment, and these assumptions can be quite complex. So, the veri cation process deals with three entities: The program, the property (expressed by an invariant) and the assumptions under which the property is intended to hold (also expressed by an invariant). Sections 5 and 6 illustrates the proposed approach on our example. The veri cation (Section 7) is performed on a nite state abstraction of the program, which models only the behavior of boolean variables. A veri cation tool, called Lesar, is available, which can apply two verication techniques:
the former is an exhaustive enumeration of the states of the (abstraction of the) program, similar to standard model checking 12, 27] . the later is a symbolic construction of the set of states which satisfy the property, analogous to \symbolic model checking" 10, 14, 15]. These techniques will be applied to the example introduced in Section 3.
Finally, Section 8 outlines a method for modular veri cation: taking advantage of the fact that the program and its properties are expressed in the same language, we can use the proved properties of a subprogram in the veri cation of a full program. This technique can reduce the complexity of the veri cation. 3 This is a more powerful mechanism than the macro-notation o ered by some speci cation languages 12, 29].
The language Lustre
We do not give here a detailed presentation of the language Lustre, which can be found elsewhere 11, 18] . We only recall the elements which are necessary for understanding the paper.
A Lustre program speci es a relation between input and output variables. Any variable or expression is intended to be a function of time. Time is assimilated to the set of natural numbers. Variables are de ned by means of equations (one and only one equation for each variable which is not an input): As said before, an equation \X=E", where E is a Lustre expression, speci es that the variable X is always equal to E.
Expressions are made of variable identi ers, constants (considered as constant functions), usual arithmetic, boolean and conditional operators (considered as pointwisely applying to functions) and only two speci c operators: the \previous" operator and the \followed-by" operator:
If E is an expression denoting the function n:e(n), then \pre(E)" is an expression denoting the function n:
( nil if n = 0 e(n ? 1) if n > 0 where nil is an unde ned value. If E and F are two expressions of the same type, respectively denoting the functions n:e(n) and n:f(n), then \E -> F" is an expression denoting the function n:
( e(n) if n = 0 f(n) if n > 0
In addition to equations, a Lustre program can contain assertions, of the form \assert E", where E is any boolean expression. This means that E is assumed to be always true during the execution of the program. For instance, \assert not(ON and OFF)" expresses that the input events ON and OFF never occur at the same time. Assertions were introduced in order to express some known properties of the environment, for optimization purposes. They will play an important role in program veri cation.
A Lustre program is structured into nodes: a node is a subprogram specifying a relation between its input and output parameters. This relation is expressed by an unordered set of equations and assertions, possibly involving local variables. Once declared, a node may be functionally used in any expression, as a basic operator. For instance the following declaration de nes a node, of general usage, which returns true whenever its boolean parameter raises from false to true: node edge(X: bool) returns (EDGE: bool); let EDGE = X -> X and not pre(X); tel Now, the expression edge(not C) is true whenever the variable C has a falling edge.
Example of program
Let us introduce an example adapted from a subway device. At each end of a subway line, a special \U-turn" section allows trains to switch from one track to the other, and to go back in the opposite direction (see Fig. 1) . A U-turn section is composed of three tracks A, B, C, and a switch S. Assuming the entering track is A and the exiting track is C, trains switching from A to C must rst wait for S to connect A with B, then transit on B and wait again for S to connect B with C before going back on C.
Considering that several trains move along the tracks and that the switch is not a safe device, two kinds of accidents may occur within the section:
if several trains are allowed to access the section together, they may collide. if the switch is not well positioned, trains will derail. It is therefore clear that controlling a U-turn section is a highly critical task. Any automatic Uturn section management system (later on called UMS) must both drive the switch and manage train movements along the section so as to avoid accidents.
Such a system is typically reactive: upon receipt of information about the switch status and about the train position inside the section, it should deliver positioning requests to the switch and access grants to trains. These four kinds of events can be modeled by the following signals:
ack AB and ack BC indicate whether the switch actually connects A with B or B with C. If none of these signals is active, trains must not take the switch.
on A, on B and on C are three sensors, one on each track of the section. They are active as long as there is a train on the track they observe.
do AB and do BC are the requests for the switch to connect A with B or B with C. grant access and grant exit are grants for trains to move along the section. They correspond to tra c lights. The rst one will allow trains to access the section only if it is empty and if the switch connects A with B. The second one will allow trains to exit B only if the switch connects B with C. An overview of the system and its environment is given in Fig. 2 . Let us now implement the UMS in Lustre. In the sequel, it is assumed that initially, there is no train in the section. Let us de ne the equations for the switch positioning requests. The switch will be requested to connect A with B each time the section is empty and to connect B with C each time a train has arrived on B. These requests will remain active until the switch is in the right position. In Lustre, we directly get the equations: Now, we have to write the equations de ning the movement grants. As mentioned before, access to the section will be granted only if it is empty and if the switch connects A with B. We therefore get the following equation: grant_access = empty_section and ack_AB;
Trains will be granted to exit the section when the switch connects B with C and when the only trains in the section are on B. So, we get: grant_exit = only_on_B and ack_BC;
We nally get the whole Lustre program for the UMS system, shown by Fig. 3 . This simple example intends to show that Lustre is well-suited for programming such systems, as all the equations written in the program are straightforwardly deduced from the informal specications of the U-turn section. The fact that equations can be written in any order encourages a progressive translation of the speci cations: each requirement is expressed in turn, possibly involving the introduction of auxiliary variables. Notice that introducing an auxiliary variable (like empty section), for naming an expression, has no in uence on the program semantics, but can increase its readability. Let us now consider the expression of the critical properties of a program. Many formalisms have been proposed for that, most of them being inspired either from temporal logics or from process algebras. However, in order to reduce the user's e ort, we have been looking for a formalism being as close as possible to the programming language. So, we propose to express a property as the invariance of some boolean Lustre expression. Having to express a property P about a program , we will write a boolean expression B such that P is satis ed if and only if B is always true during any execution of . It has been shown elsewhere 7] that Lustre can be viewed as a subset of linear temporal logic 25], and that any safety property can be expressed in that way. From our experience, the critical properties required for a real-time system almost always fall into this class: as a matter of fact, nobody cares whether an alarm eventually follows a dangerous situation, but rather whether it occurs within a given delay! Let us show how some useful non trivial temporal operators can be expressed as Lustre nodes. Consider the following property: \Any occurrence of a critical situation causes an alarm, which must be sustained within a ve seconds delay" Such a property relates three events: the occurrence of the critical situation, the alarm, and the deadline. A general pattern for this property is the following one: \Any occurrence of the event A must cause the condition B to be true until the next occurrence of the event C" However, this formulation is not directly translatable into Lustre as it refers to what happens in the future following an A occurrence, while Lustre only allows references to the past with respect to the current instant. That is why we rst translate it into the equivalent past expression:
\Any time A has occurred in the past, either B has been continuously true, or C has occurred at least once, since the last occurrence of A" Let us de ne a node, taking three boolean input parameters A, B, C, and returning a boolean output X such that X is always true if and only if the property holds: node always_from_to(B,A,C: bool) returns (X: bool); let X = implies(after(A), always_since(B,A) or once_since(C,A)); tel
The equation de ning X uses four auxiliary nodes:
The nodes implies implements the ordinary logical implication:
node implies(A, B: bool) returns (AimpliesB: bool); let AimpliesB = not A or B; tel The node after returns the value false until the rst time its input is true. Then it returns true for ever: node after(A: bool) returns (afterA: bool); let afterA = false -> pre(A or afterA); tel
The node always since has two inputs and returns true if and only if its rst input has been continuously true since the last time its second input was true: node always_since(B,A: bool) returns (alwaysBsinceA: bool); let alwaysBsinceA = if A then B else if after(A) then B and pre(alwaysBsinceA) else true; tel Finally, the node once since has two inputs and returns true if and only if its rst input has been at least once true since the last time its second input was true: node once_since(C,A: bool) returns (onceCsinceA: bool); let onceCsinceA = if A then C else if after(A) then C or pre(onceCsinceA) else true; tel These nodes will be used in our example. Of course, other operators could be de ned in the same way (see 19]).
Critical properties of the example
Let us express in Lustre the set of safety properties required from our U-turn management system. As mentioned before, this system must always avoid the occurrence of two dangerous situations.
The rst one concerns train collisions. We have to check that a train may enter the section only if this one is empty. In Lustre, this property will be expressed by the invariance of a boolean variable no collision, de ned as follows: no_collision = implies(grant_access,empty_section);
From the equation de ning grant access, this property is obviously true. So, assuming that no train enters the section by track C, it is possible to consider by now that no more than one train is in the section at any time.
We only have to check now that a train entering the section by track A will always leave it by track C, and that no derailment is possible. This leads to verify how the switch is driven. First, it is clear that the switch positioning requests should never be both active at the same time. This is simply expressed by the invariance of the following Lustre expression: exclusive_req = not(do_AB and do_BC);
The switch should also connect A to B from the instant when a train is allowed to enter the section until it has arrived on track B. This leads to the following property: no_derail_AB = always_from_to(ack_AB, grant_access, only_on_B); Similarly, the switch should always connect B to C from the instant when a train is allowed to leave the section until it has actually left it: no_derail_BC = always_from_to(ack_BC, grant_exit, empty_section);
Notice that if the above property is true, a train cannot leave the section by track A.
Finally, the global property to prove is expressed by the following Lustre equation: property = no_collision and exclusive_req and no_derail_AB and no_derail_BC; 6 Modeling the environment The next step in the veri cation process should consist in running the veri cation tool and check whether the safety properties above are preserved by the UMS. However, at that point, an important and crucial task is to provide a description of how the environment of the system behaves. Actually, the environment obeys some rules which restrict its possible behaviors. For instance, in a U-turn section, trains are assumed to stop when tra c lights are red. The veri cation tool would certainly not achieve checking the system without being aware of such an information. It is therefore necessary to de ne some assumptions about the behavior of the environment. In Lustre, this is done using the assertion mechanism. As said before, Lustre assertions express that some boolean expressions can be assumed to be always true.
Let us describe in that way some important features of the U-turn section environment. We can make the following assumptions about the switch: the switch cannot both connect A with B and B with C:
assert not(ack_AB and ack_BC);
Once in a given position, the switch remains stable unless it is requested to move to the opposite position: assert always_from_to(ack_AB,ack_AB,do_BC) and always_from_to(ack_BC,ack_BC,do_AB);
About train movements inside the section, we make the following assumptions: Initially, there is no train in the section.
assert empty_section -> true;
(Remember that \empty section -> true" is equal to \empty section" at the initial instant, and then is true forever; so the above assertion only restricts the initial value of \empty section") Trains obey tra c lights. So, if a train enters or leaves the section, then the corresponding tra c light was green at the instant before. Therefore, we get (using the node edge de ned in Section 2):
assert true -> implies(edge(not empty_section), pre grant_access); assert true -> implies(edge(on_C), pre grant_exit);
When a train leaves A, it is on B. When a train leaves B, it is either on A or on C.
assert implies(edge(not on_A),on_B); assert implies(edge(not on_B), on_A or on_C);
This example and our experience show that specifying the environment behavior of a program requires important e orts. Such a work undoubtly adds some complexity to the veri cation task. However, giving such a precise speci cation of the assumptions made on the environment behavior is certainly a useful task in designing a critical system. Moreover, notice that these assumptions can be dynamically checked, during the execution of the program (a compiler option produces the corresponding code). They can be used also in a testing phase, for choosing valid testcases.
Program veri cation
We consider now the veri cation problem. Given a program , a property P expressed by a boolean expression B which must be invariantly true under some assumptions expressed by an assertion A, we can build a new program 0 by putting together , the computation of B and the assertion assert A, considering the result of B to be the only output of 0 (see Fig. 4 ). The problem thus reduces to proving that the only boolean output of 0 is always true during any execution of the program which permanently satis es the assertion assert A. The veri cation is performed on a nite state abstraction of the program. Any numerical computation is deliberately ignored, and boolean expressions depending on numerical variables (e.g., comparisons) are considered non deterministic. However, assertions can be used again to restrict this non determinism: For instance, if tests on conditions \X<Y", \Y<Z" and \X<Z" appear in the program, the assertion \implies(X<Y and Y<Z, X<Z)" will prevent the prover to consider absurd cases corresponding to \X<Y<Z" and \X Z".
So, we consider a purely boolean, non deterministic program only contains boolean variables, it represents a nite state machine, on which any veri cation problem is decidable: proving that its output is always true amounts to enumerate its nite set of states, checking that, in each state | belonging to a path starting from the initial state and on which the assertions are always true | and for each input vector, the output evaluates to true. Two \veri cation engines" have been implemented and integrated into a veri cation tool, called Lesar:
The rst one explicitly enumerates the reachable states, as done by standard \model checkers" 12, 27] . The main limitation of such an approach is obviously the number of states that can be considered. The present version of the tool deals with programs of about 1,000,000 states in reasonable time (less than 1 hour).
The second engine proceeds symbolically: starting from a boolean formula F 0 , characterizing the set of states where the output is true (in Lustre this formula is the expression of the property), it iteratively computes a sequence F 1 ; F 2 ; : : :; F n of formulas, where F i+1 characterizes the set of states, belonging to F i and necessarily leading (in one execution step) into F i . As soon as the initial state doesn't satisfy F i , one can conclude that the property is not satis ed, since there exists an execution path leading to a state where the output is false. Otherwise, since the state space is nite, the sequence of formulas converges after a nite number of steps to a formula F which characterizes the set of states from which it is not possible to reach a state violating the property. Our tool performs symbolic computations over formulas using binary decision diagrams (\BDDs" 9]), a compact canonical encoding of boolean formulas. This approach is sometimes called \symbolic model checking " 10, 14, 15] . The two approaches are complementary: in some cases, the enumerative method is cheaper than the symbolic one, and conversely. The main limitation of the enumerative method is the number of reachable states which must be considered, whereas the symbolic method is limited by the complexity of boolean formulas (the size of the BDDs encoding it). Now, the complexity of The program provided to Lesar for dealing with our example is listed in Fig. 5 . The times (in sec., on SUN4) needed for proving its properties (separately and globally) using each method are gathered in the Of course, the example is so simple that these results are hardly meaningful. However, we have treated more signi cant programs: In particular, the experience driven in 17] deals with a real nuclear plant control system; all the critical properties required of this system have been expressed (so, they were all safety properties) and veri ed using Lesar, in spite of the fact that this example involves a lot of real-valued variables. As a matter of fact, these variables only appeared in the properties by means of threshold comparisons, which have been handled using assertions.
Modular veri cation
The fact that program and properties are expressed in the same language, together with the assertion mechanism provide also a method for modular veri cation: Informally, given a program compound of n subprograms 1 ; 2 ; : : :; n , and once each i has been proved to satisfy a safety property P i (i = 1 : : :n), one can prove that satis es a safety property P by proving that the combination of the P i implies P. More formally, if we note \ j = P" the fact that the program satis es the safety property P, and if jj denotes the parallel composition, we have 1 j = P 1 ; 2 j = P 2 ( 1 jj 2 ) j = P 1^P2 This can be done in Lustre in the following way: Let be a program using some node 0 ( Fig. 6.a) (Fig. 6.b) . Formally, if we note \2B" the property that B is always true, 0 j = 2B ; ( ;assert B) j = P ( jj 0 ) j = P Of course, the property P 0 (which must be found by intuition) may be too weak to allow the proof of P, but such a decomposition may drastically reduce the complexity of the veri cation.
For instance, the proved properties of the UMS system could be used for verifying the control of a whole subway track ( 
Conclusion and future work
We have tried to highlight the advantages of using a synchronous data-ow language in designing a real-time program. These advantages are twofold: On one hand, such a language meets traditional tools used in this eld, and on the other hand, since it can be viewed as an executable temporal logic, it allows the expression of speci cations and the smooth merging of programs and properties.
The synchronous hypothesis relegates \real-time" problems to the evaluation of program reaction time. Under this hypothesis, a program can be modeled by standard transition systems. As a consequence, our approach to program veri cation is quite standard, and even rather restricted, since it only deals with checking safety properties on nite state program abstractions. These restrictions have been introduced in order to tackle real-life problems, and we have argued that they meet many practical cases. Notice that, in contrast with many veri cation tools which deal with models of programs, our tools apply directly to programs themselves, thus meeting G. Berry's \WYPIWYE" principle 4]: What you prove is what you execute! There is no manual transformation between the program which is veri ed and the code which is executed.
Of course, both programming and veri cation rely on the synchronous hypothesis. This hypothesis must be checked in ne for the results to be valid. However, this checking only consists in evaluating the maximum execution time of linear pieces of code (the reactions), and is therefore easy. This work will be pursued, at least in two directions:
The restriction to boolean abstractions is a strong limitation. Dealing with some properties about bounded integers would certainly be worthwhile. In particular, integer variables are often used in Lustre to count delays. Up to now, our tools are not aware that a delay of 3 seconds is shorter that one of 10 seconds! Recent works on timed graph analysis 1, 16] could be adapted for that. A lot of work remains to be done around modular veri cation and program synthesis.
In the approach proposed in x8, the speci cation of a subprogram must be provided by intuition. It would be appealing to synthesize automatically this speci cation, using our symbolic veri cation tool: Assume a program , calling a sub-program 0 , is required to satisfy a property P, i.e., the invariance of some boolean expression B. We can rst remove 
